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1 In this chapter, I will elaborate on the precise nature of the neo-pragmatist agenda for
the social sciences which I have been developing over the last couple of years and which I
have tried to crystallize in Philosophy of the Sciences: Towards Pragmatism (Baert 2005) and a
number of other publications (e.g. Baert 2006, 2007). I will argue that this neo-pragmatist
agenda  changes  our  priorities  about  social  research.  Its  significance  can  be  shown
especially in relation to the writings of a number of authors, who engage with Husserl’s
phenomenology. There is much to be gained by integrating insights from American neo-
pragmatism and, in particular Emmanuel Levinas,  Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jean-Paul
Sartre.  Although prima facie  very different,  these three Continental-European authors
have a non-representational view of knowledge and language in common, as well as a
commitment  to  putting  the  ongoing  engagement  with  difference  at  the  centre  of
philosophy. I will argue that this new way of thinking about philosophy has repercussions
for how we conduct social research in ways that tie in especially neatly with the recent
debates around, for instance, public sociology.
2 By pragmatism I refer to the distinct philosophical tradition, initially set in motion by
Charles Peirce, later developed by William James and John Dewey, and further articulated
by Richard Bernstein and Richard Rorty. This philosophical tradition is often portrayed as
quintessentially American, and for very good reasons. Not only did the major pragmatists
live and work in the US. Their philosophical works emerged in response to distinctly
American problems and concerns; they expressed distinctly American sentiments, hopes
and anxieties. This is not to say that pragmatism is solely an American enterprise. Some
European  philosophers  of  the  nineteenth  century,  like  Henri  Bergson  and  Friedrich
Nietzsche, developed views which were remarkably close to those of pragmatism, as did
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the Oxford-based philosopher F. C. S. Schiller at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Some of the older generation of American pragmatists studied in Europe, had regular
intellectual exchanges with European intellectuals and were very much indebted to them.
More recent exponents of pragmatist philosophy, like Rorty and Bernstein, engaged with
and saw affinities with a number of Continental European authors who were considered
seriously out of line within the analytical tradition. The multiplicity of influences is not
surprising,  given  that  American  pragmatism  has  always  portrayed  itself  as  non-
doctrinaire,  open  and  receptive  to  new  ideas,  in  contrast  with  the  boundary-
consciousness of analytical philosophy and its general disdain towards much written in
the German and French tradition.
3 If American pragmatism has been shown to be open to European philosophy, the latter
has been less receptive towards the former. There are notable exceptions like Jürgen
Habermas  (1981a,  1981b,  1994  [1968]),  whose  critique  of  positivism  and  theory  of
communicative  action  drew  on  Peirce  and  the  pragmatist  tradition.  All  too  often,
however, Pragmatism has been discarded as a parochial endeavour, too deeply ingrained
in American society and its  problems to appeal  to a broader philosophical  audience.
Underlying my contribution is the conviction that this picture of pragmatism is deeply
misleading.  By  integrating  American  neo-pragmatism  and  phenomenology,  I  will
demonstrate not only the bearing of pragmatism on contemporary philosophy of social
science,  but also the fruitfulness of  a  continued dialogue between the two traditions
which on the surface look so different.
4 Although the argument which I will develop here is inspired by pragmatist philosophy,
noably by Bernstein and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, this is not to say that either of them
would endorse the views that I develop, let alone express them precisely in the way in
which I do. Although generally sympathetic to their outlook, the problems addressed in
this  chapter  and  the  questions  asked  are  quite  different  from  those  of  the  neo-
pragmatists, and the argument elaborated stands very much on its own.
5 This  article  consists  of  six  parts.  The  first  section  discusses  which  components  of
pragmatist philosophy are central to my proposal for the philosophy of social science,
and  the  second  section  demonstrates  how  my  perspective  differs from  the  two
approaches that dominate the philosophy of social science and social research. The third
section explores the relationship between my agenda and Sartre’s ontology, in particular
his distinction between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. The fourth section explains
how my approach draws on Levinas’ conceptualisation of otherness, and the fifth shows
how  my  pragmatist-inspired  proposal  ties  in  with  Gadamer’s  dialogical  notion  of
understanding. Finally, the article shows the contemporary relevance of my proposal by
focusing on the significance of social research for society.
 
Pragmatism and Pragmatisms
6 Before  we  proceed  further,  it  is  important  to  gain  clarity  as  to  the  meaning  of
“pragmatism” and a “pragmatist agenda” as opposed to the employment of the term in
everyday  language.  People  often  equate  “pragmatism”  with  a  “pragmatic”  attitude,
according to which action ought not to be guided by a priori principles but primarily by an
assessment of  the actual  constraints and opportunities of  a given context.  In foreign
policy, the label “pragmatism” refers precisely to this non-ideological stance, whereby
political actors routinely seek to gauge and take advantage of what comes their way.
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Likewise, when social scientists label research as “pragmatist,” sometimes they mean that
it  does not follow rigid methodological  principles and instead exhibits  an eclectic  or
opportunistic choice and application of method. In those circumstances, I prefer to term
this a “pragmatic” attitude to distinguish it from the “pragmatist” argument developed
here. So a pragmatic stance implies that the choice of theories or techniques depends on
the particular topic of investigation or situation at hand rather than on a well-articulated
philosophical or theoretical position.
7 My argument  for  a  pragmatist  stance has  little  in  common with the methodological
opportunism that characterises a pragmatic attitude. Firstly, I am not arguing that social
researchers  should  pick  and  choose  the  theoretical  framework  or  technique  that
somehow “fits” or “corresponds” best to the data or that seems opportune given the
circumstances. I am actually sceptical of this view, not in the least because it draws on a
problematic metaphor of vision as if social research is meant to mirror the external social
world  as  accurately  as  possible  (of which  more  in  section  two).  Secondly,  whilst  a
pragmatic  attitude  questions  the  usefulness  of  any  philosophical  account  for  social
research,  pragmatism questions the value of some philosophical debates,  in particular
about essences or ontology, and it also doubts the merit of some philosophical views, for
instance, foundationalism. Pragmatism is sceptical of intellectual disputes if taking one or
another position has no practical consequences for anyone (James 1907). For pragmatists,
questions  about  inner  essences  or  ontology  are  such  scholastic  enterprises  because
answering them in one way or another makes no practical difference.
8 What is the common ground which pragmatist philosophers share? What distinguishes
the pragmatist outlook from those of other philosophical traditions? And which of the
pragmatists’  ideas  have  influenced  my  own agenda  for  the  philosophy  of  the  social
sciences? To identify which ideas are shared by pragmatists is not a sinecure because
pragmatism was, and still is, a heterogeneous entity. From the beginning, pragmatism
entailed competing branches and antithetical positions, even to the extent that Charles
Peirce, who coined the term, later distanced himself from “pragmatism” because he felt
that some of the beliefs carried under this banner were so alien to his. It is ironic that
some philosophers, whom we now regard as iconic figures of the pragmatist movement,
occasionally invoked other labels to refer to themselves, with Peirce’s “pragmaticism”
and Dewey’s  “instrumentalism” being particularly  poignant  examples.  More recently,
Richard Bernstein, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty
have taken pragmatism into uncharted territories (such as literary criticism and critical
theory). This has led commentators to question whether some of those contemporary
developments can be as easily reconciled with earlier forms of pragmatism as the likes of
Rorty would have us believe.
9 Nevertheless,  it  would be a mistake to infer from this that pragmatists have little in
common. Most pragmatist philosophers – old and new – share a number of key ideas,
which makes it possible to talk about a pragmatist movement. It is particularly important
to illustrate a number of these ideas here because they underscore my perspective on the
philosophy of the social sciences.
10 To start with, few commentators mention the humanist tendencies of pragmatism, which
is  surprising  given  how pervasive  humanism is  amongst  classical  and  contemporary
pragmatists and how essential  it  is  to their intellectual  project.  William James (1911:
121-35), John Dewey (1994) and F. C. S. Schiller (1903, 1907) occasionally used the term to
contextualise  their  own  work,  though  they  attributed  different  meanings  to  it.  By
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humanism I refer to a particular perspective according to which cognitive, ethical and
aesthetic  claims,  including  claims  about  those  claims,  are  intertwined  with  human
projects  and are predominantly human creations.  Not only ought those claims to be
judged on their practical  contribution to society,  they are also social  and cultural  in
nature, often entailing the cooperation of many individuals and drawing on a complex
web of symbols and cultural codes. The social and cultural dimension of those claims has,
in turn, a number of repercussions, of which the rejection of both foundationalism and
objective knowledge are particularly important. 
11 By foundationalism one refers to the belief that philosophy can establish a-temporal,
universal foundations that secure aesthetic,  ethical or cognitive claims. Historically, a
significant number of philosophers conceived of their work as primarily a foundational
enterprise. To be foundational in this sense, philosophy ought to be able to step outside
history – outside culture or language – so as to adopt a “neutral” position from which the
right kind of prescriptions can be made. Most pragmatists take an anti-foundationalist
stance.  They  believe  that  philosophical  reflection  cannot  achieve  this  position  of
neutrality because it is, like other intellectual accomplishments, a human activity; and as
a human activity,  a social  activity;  and as a social activity,  a situated activity (see,  for
instance, Peirce 1877, 1878; Dewey 1938; Rorty 1982: xiiff.; Bernstein 1991: 326ff.). This
means that philosophical knowledge, like any other kind of knowledge, is always partial:
it  takes  place  from  a  certain  vantage  point.  Pragmatists  call  for  humility  amongst
philosophers, because, no matter what the amount of cleaning work they do, philosophy
can never remove those human stains. As such, it cannot obtain the neutral stance which
foundationalism requires.
12 A similar argument applies to other forms of knowledge, including scientific knowledge
(Dewey 1929; James 1907). Scientific knowledge, too, is situated, partial, enacted from a
particular viewpoint. Logical positivists spent a great deal of effort showing that scientific
knowledge is superior to other forms of knowledge because it supposedly meets stringent
criteria of objectivity. In this context, one talks about objective knowledge if it is not
affected significantly by the attitudes and values of those who obtain this knowledge. In
contrast, pragmatists insist that scientific knowledge is an intervention in the world and
that,  as  an  intervention,  it  is  necessarily  shaped  by  the  interests  or  focus  of  the
researchers involved. This does not mean that knowledge is necessarily always subjective,
if by subjective we mean that it fails to represent the external world accurately. In fact,
pragmatists avoid using the label “subjective” altogether; firstly, because it implies the
possibility of objective knowledge in the way in which logical positivism postulated it;
and secondly, because it mistakenly assumes that knowledge has something to do with
the copying of the external world.
13 Descartes’ method supposedly provided philosophical foundations that ensure infallible
knowledge. In contrast, the pragmatist world is indicative of what Hilary Putnam called
the  “democratisation  of  inquiry”:  devoid  of  foundations,  people  are  encouraged  to
reassess  their  views  in  the  light  of  new  empirical  evidence  (Putnam 2004).  Various
pragmatists  might  interpret  this  fallibilism  differently.  For  the  older  generation  of
pragmatists, like Peirce, Dewey and Mead, scientific conjectures are empirically tested
and, if necessary, replaced by superior scientific conjectures. It is the confrontation with
new empirical  phenomena that  precipitates  doubt,  which only subsides  once the old
theory has been adjusted. Neo-pragmatists are less concerned with scientific discovery
and change. They are more interested in how communities can adopt new vocabularies,
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redescribing themselves in the light of the new information provided. Rich, vital cultures
are confident enough to exhibit openness towards uncomfortable experiences. As such,
they are well-equipped to redescribe and reinvent themselves. However, in both cases,
anti-foundationalism goes hand in hand with a genuine fallibilist attitude whereby people
are willing to question entrenched beliefs and replace them with more useful ones.
14 I already hinted earlier at the pragmatist rejection of the mirror view of knowledge (see,
for instance, James 1907; Dewey 1929; Rorty 1980, 1999: 47-71). This mirror view conceives
of knowledge in terms of passive and accurate recording of the essence of the external
world. In this view, the external world is taken to be independent of human experience,
waiting to be discovered. This pictorial view has its intellectual origins in the Platonic
perspective on knowledge. Plato took knowledge as passive contemplation as opposed to
active  involvement;  only  the  philosophers’  contemplation  would  allow  proper  and
unmediated access to the real world. The mirror view is widespread both in philosophical
and scientific circles, and it assumes an opposition between theory and knowledge on the
one hand, and practice and action on the other. Knowledge is taken to be passive and
instantaneous, whereas action is, by definition, active and proceeds through time. One of
the up-shots of this view is that knowledge should no longer be judged on the basis of its
isomorphic  relationship  to  the  external  realm,  but  on  the  basis  of  what  kind  of
contribution it makes to our world. For too long, the dualism between theory and practice
and  its  attendant  preoccupation  with  accurate representation  has  led  western
philosophers to ignore the practical difference knowledge can make. Pragmatism breaks
with this dualism and takes seriously the notion of scientific engagement.
 
Pragmatist-Inspired Philosophy of Social Science
15 Pragmatism, as outlined above, has significant repercussions for the philosophy of the
social sciences. The philosophy of social science is a meta-theoretical enterprise which
reflects on the nature and workings of social research, often leading to recommendations
about which methodology or theory should be used. My pragmatist-inspired perspective
on the philosophy of  social  science draws on the insights  illustrated in the previous
section and on the integration of pragmatism and continental philosophy (infra). This
perspective, centred around the notion of self-understanding, is diametrically opposed to
two perspectives  which  have  dominated  the  mainstream of  the  philosophy of  social
science, and which I call “representationalism” and “methodological naturalism.” In what
follows I describe and criticise these two perspectives, and this will allow me to discuss in
more detail the contours of my perspective.
16 To  start  with,  “representationalism”  is  a  widespread  position  in  meta-theoretical
reflections  on  the  social  sciences,  though  more  implicit  than  overtly  defended  or
propagated. Representationalists presuppose that social research aims to map or depict
the social world as accurately and completely as possible, with social theory providing the
necessary building blocks for this social cartography. Empirical research is regarded as
fruitful if the theory used is shown to be eminently applicable and to allow for the social
cartography to take place effectively. Amongst those who adhere to this philosophical
outlook are structuralists, structuration theorists and critical realists, although most do
so implicitly rather than defending it explicitly. The problems with representationalism
are  twofold,  one  referring  to  the  mechanical  and  repetitive  nature  of  the  research
conducted under its banner, and the other referring to its flawed notion of knowledge.
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Firstly, it makes for repetitive and uninspiring research, whereby a particular theoretical
framework, to which a group of researchers is committed, is habitually applied to new
settings, and thereby continually used and reproduced. In this social cartography model,
empirical research reinforces the theory that is used, rather than checking its validity. As
empirical research is no longer seen as a testing device but as providing instantiations of
a given  theory  (and  so  yielding  yet  further  evidence  that  the  theory  “fits”  various
situations),  the possibility of theoretical  innovation is very limited and operates only
within the contours set by the theory. Secondly, representationalists assume what John
Dewey  facetiously  called  the  “spectator  theory  of  knowledge”  according  to  which
knowledge mysteriously captures the inner essence of the external world (Dewey 1929).
As seen in the previous section, the spectator theory of knowledge is problematic, relying
as it does on a passive notion of knowledge acquisition as if it is a flaccid mirroring of the
outer  world  (Rorty  1980;  1999:  xvi-xxxii,  23-46).  Also,  it  fails  to  grasp  the  temporal
dimension of knowledge acquisition, the extent to which it is the outcome of a process
rather than an instantaneous occurrence. In this context, it is worth invoking Dewey’s
distinction  between  “knowledge”  and  “experience”:  whereas  the  latter  alludes  to  a
passive and immediate sensation of the outer world, the former refers to the outcome of
an active process of reflection (Dewey 1910, 1929). The spectator theory of knowledge
erroneously conflates the immediacy and passivity that is characteristic of experience
with that of knowledge, thereby promoting a flawed notion of “immediate knowledge.”
More generally, influenced by Darwinism, the early generation of pragmatists already
conceived of knowledge in terms of process and action, insisting that knowledge is one of
the tools people use to adjust, cope and interact with their external surroundings (Mead
1936,  1938).  While  from  an  evolutionary  point  of  view,  the  intricate  link  between
knowledge, process and action is imminently plausible, it is more difficult to see how,
through time, people would have managed to develop knowledge that represents the
world as it really is. Similar to Gadamer for whom any act of description or making sense
of the external world draws on a variety of presuppositions which give the representation
direction and shape, pragmatists are committed to a holistic perspective according to
which so-called statements of fact always tie in with theoretical presuppositions.
17 Moving to the second meta-theoretical perspective, a significant number of philosophers
of social science are committed “methodological naturalists,” searching for a unifying
scientific  method which would be applicable to both the natural  and social  sciences.
Within  the  discipline  of  philosophy  falsificationists  and  critical  realists  subscribe  to
methodological naturalism, whereas in the social sciences diverse research programmes,
ranging from rational choice theory to Durkheim-inspired structural analysis, accept this
philosophical  position  albeit  often  implicitly  rather  than  discursively  formulated.
Methodological naturalism should not be confused with “ontological naturalism,” which
assumes that the social and the natural sciences are comprised of the same substance.
Methodological naturalism assumes that a distinctive method underlies most, if not all,
successful  scientific  activities,  and  that  philosophical  reflection  can  show  why  this
method is so superior to others. This means that methodological naturalists hold two
distinct, though related views, one being philosophical and the other historical. On the
one hand, they are wedded to a foundationalist outlook which supposedly captures the
essence  of  science  –  that  which  distinguishes  it  from  lesser  forms  of  knowledge
acquisition like religion,  ideology or  pseudo-science.  On the other hand,  they hold a
particular historical view according to which the natural sciences have employed this
successful methodological strategy for quite a while whereas the social sciences, being
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too  close  to  their  subject  matter,  have  consistently  failed  to  do  so.  Unsurprisingly,
naturalist  philosophers  of  social  sciences  often  make  recommendations  for  social
research, urging it to grow up and emulate the “mature science” which can be found in
the departments of physics and chemistry.
18 As  indicated  in  the  earlier  section,  pragmatists  tend  to  question  the  virtues  of
foundationalist reasoning in general,  and in this case the empirical studies of science
seem to confirm this scepticism. Contrary to the naturalist agenda, studies in the history
and in  sociology  of  science  show that  the  closer  we  look  at  the  actual  workings  of
scientists,  the  less  support  emerges  for  a  unifying  methodology  within  the  natural
sciences, let alone across the natural and social sciences (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1979).
There is a growing awareness that scientific research does not fit neat, objectivist criteria,
that various disciplines operate quite differently, and that within each discipline there
are national and local traditions which culminate in distinct methodological practices to
such an extent that it is no longer warranted to talk about a unifying method.
19 Whereas naturalist philosophies of social science take for granted that social research is
primarily  an  explanatory  (and  possibly  predictive)  endeavour,  a  pragmatist-inspired
perspective explores the intricate relationship between method and cognitive interests
and refuses to take for granted that explanation and prediction are the only legitimate
cognitive interests (see also Rorty 1982:  191-210).  Besides explanation and prediction,
pragmatists also consider other cognitive interests to be integral to the social sciences,
amongst  which are  meaningful  understanding,  social  critique and emancipation,  and
(importantly for my argument) self-understanding (Baert 2005: 146-69). Whereas classical
pragmatists  focused  on  the  problem solving  qualities  of  science,  my  neo-pragmatist
perspective, influenced by Rorty’s appropriation of the German notion of Bildung or self-
edification, underscores the importance of the notion of self-understanding. This concept
refers  to  the  process  by  which  knowledge  can  help  groups  of  people  redescribe,
reevaluate and reconceptualise themselves. Major breakthroughs in science have often
been accompanied by substantial  changes in the way in which people conceptualised
themselves. In some cases, such as with Darwinism, this even led to a radical rethinking
of the position of humanity as a whole.
20 Self-understanding occupies a particularly central place in the humanities and the social
sciences, serving as they do to encourage groups of people to rethink who they are in the
face of a confrontation with other forms of meaningful activity. This explains why some
commentators go as far as arguing that the emergence of sociology or the social sciences
is  itself  a  sign of  increasing collective self-knowledge under conditions of  modernity
(Wagner 1994). Crucially, when academics in the humanities and social sciences are asked
to list the intellectual milestones of their discipline, they tend to select works which bring
about this Gestalt-switch. Whereas self-understanding might be an interesting corollary of
significant transformations in the natural sciences, the case of the humanities and social
sciences is quite different as self-understanding is absolutely integral to what makes for a
substantial work in this area of the academy. Key contributions to social research might
obtain other cognitive interests – for instance, they might exhibit strong explanatory or
predictive power –, but ultimately, I argue, self-understanding remains the key criterion
by  which  the  significance  of  a  piece  of  research  will  be  judged  (Baert  2007).  Self-
understanding does not imply that people necessarily agree on how to re-conceptualise
themselves in the light of a new or established framework, and indeed there is often
substantial  disagreement  on  this  score.  But  whether  or  not  there is  agreement,  a
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significant contribution in the humanities and the social sciences forces individuals to
reconsider  some  of  their  presuppositions  about  themselves  in  the  face  of  the  new
narrative presented.
21 In  what  follows,  I  will  discuss  particular  aspects  of  the  work  of  Jean-Paul  Sartre,
Emmanuel  Levinas  and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  By  doing so,  I  will  demonstrate  that  a
dialogue  between  neo-pragmatism  and  European  phenomenology  is  possible.  More
importantly,  this  fruitful  dialogue leads  to  an identification of  the key features  of  a
method  (and  an  ethos)  of  social  research  which  revolves  around the  idea  of  self-
understanding and which bears more promise for the social sciences than the current
fixation on representationalism and methodological naturalism.
22 While Sartre, Levinas and Gadamer all engage with Husserl’s phenomenology, each takes
it in a direction different from Husserl’s that is convergent with mine. What follows is not
an attempt to rediscover or resuscitate Husserl’s philosophy (which in crucial respects is
diametrically opposed to my neo-pragmatist  argument),  but to show how subsequent
developments within phenomenology help enrich a neo-pragmatist perspective on the
philosophy of the social  sciences.  There is,  however,  one important link between my
argument and Husserl’s which is worth mentioning at this stage. For Husserl, philosophy
is not merely an intellectual enterprise without external value; it is also a means for
obtaining self-knowledge or self-discovery. Philosophy enables the individual to create a
useful distance towards him- or herself and to conceptualise the self differently. This, so
Husserl argued, would eventually help to create a form of freedom. The neo-pragmatist
argument,  which I  have been developing,  takes  equally  seriously  this  notion of  self-
knowledge and recognises the important role philosophy may play in achieving it. There
are differences, though, between the neo-pragmatist use of self-knowledge and that of
Husserl.  Essential  to my argument is  that  the social  sciences –  not  philosophy – are
particularly  well-placed  for  achieving  it.  Also  different  from  Husserl’s  individualist
reading is the neo-pragmatist argument that self-knowledge is a collective achievement;
it is something shared by members of a community.
 
Sartre and Epistemological Authenticity
23 My neo-pragmatist philosophy of the social sciences shows striking affinities with the
existentialist  phenomenology as it  was developed by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul
Sartre.  Both Heidegger  and Sartre  engage  critically  with  Husserl’s  writings  and take
phenomenology  in  a  new  direction,  which  I  would  argue  is  closer  to  pragmatist
philosophy.  Firstly,  like  pragmatists,  existentialist  phenomenologists  recognise  the
quintessentially human nature of cognitive, ethical and aesthetic claims. This position
leads, amongst other things, to the questioning of both the possibility of objectivity and
of the viability of epistemology, because it is no longer held possible for philosophers and
scientists to decipher a neutral algorithm that would allow them to escape history and
culture. Secondly, like pragmatists, existential phenomenologists reject the opposition or
dualism between the subject and an independent external world. As people’s knowledge
is seen as inevitably embedded in and practically engaged with the world, the opposition
between the knower and known, assumed by both realism and idealism, becomes a mere
artificial  intellectual  construct.  Thirdly,  both philosophical  strands – pragmatism and
existential phenomenology – reject the spectator theory of knowledge according to which
knowledge  mirrors  or  captures  the  external  world.  Indeed  existentialist
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phenomenologists distanced themselves from Husserl whose notion of the transcendental
ego – a disembodied, detached ego – was indicative of the way in which he was still
wedded to a spectator theory of knowledge. In contrast with the spectator theory that
conceives of objects as vorhanden (“present-at-hand,” detached), existentialists emphasise
that people encounter objects first and foremost as zuhanden (“ready-to-hand,” like a
tool). Pragmatists and existentialists argue that the form of reflexive intelligence, which
is characteristic of vorhanden, only arises when people are confronted with unexpected
experiences. Fourthly, whereas Husserl’s phenomenology conceives of meaning in terms
of essences and senses of words, existentialist phenomenology resembles pragmatism in
promoting  a  holistic  picture  and  in  demonstrating  the  intricate  link  between
understanding  and  purposive  action.  So  in  contrast  with  Husserl, pragmatists  and
existentialists  subscribe  to  Wittgenstein’s  later  views  about  meaning  and  how  it  is
embedded in larger systems or “forms of life.”
24 In  clarifying  the  connections  between  the  neo-pragmatist  agenda  and  existentialist
phenomenology,  Sartre’s  L’être  et  le  néant  (1943) and L’existentialisme est  un humanisme
(1996) are particularly instructive. Sartre’s anti-essentialism manifests itself in his refusal
to accept that human beings – any human being, as a matter of fact – can be defined in
terms of a set of fixed characteristics. However subtle a description of an individual, he or
she is always able to overcome this account and prove otherwise through his or her
actions. Ultimately, people are nothing but the sum of their actions, so it is a fallacy, for
instance,  to  say  that  a  person who acted cowardly  all  his  life  was  deep down truly
courageous  (Sartre  1996:  26-7,  29-30).  People  might  adopt  strategies  to  deny  their
intrinsic  freedom,  and  there  are  indeed  various  instances  of  this  bad  faith,  but  a
genuinely full life requires that one acknowledges the freedom which one has and makes
choices whilst  ensuring that  others are free as  well.  Freedom is  also at  the heart  of
Sartre’s distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Whereas being-in-itself
exists independent of consciousness and can therefore only be what it is, being-for-itself
refers to the fluid aspect of human existence. It was Hegel who initially coined the term
“being-for-itself” to refer to the uniquely self-conscious dimension of human being, the
extent to which individuals are, unlike objects, able to reflect on the conditions of their
existence  and to  act  accordingly.  Likewise,  Sartre’s  notion of  being-for-itself  centres
round the reflexive component of human existence, capturing as it does the ability of
human beings  to  transcend the  most  structurally  constraining  of  circumstances  and
ultimately their capacity to exercise genuine freedom even in the face of severe adversity
(Sartre 1943: 109-41).
25 Sartre  focused  on  individuals  and  individual  decisions  but  his  arguments  can  be
translated  into  a  social  vocabulary,  a  move  which  helps  to  further  clarify  the  neo-
pragmatist proposal which I have been advocating. Just as Sartre argued that individuals
have the freedom to define themselves and to deny the categories that are imposed on
them,  a  given  social  setting  does  not  necessitate  a  specific  account,  descriptions  or
explanation. Just like individuals who, by virtue of their self-consciousness, escape fixed
descriptions,  any social  setting can be redescribed and rearticulated ad infinitum and
there is no a priori reason to rule out any of those accounts on epistemological grounds.
Both representationalists and naturalists are mistaken in searching for a final vocabulary
that  would mysteriously  “fit”  a  given social  situation because the epistemological  or
theoretical justifications provided have been shown to be flawed. For social researchers
to search for such a final vocabulary is basically to act in what Sartre would call bad faith
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(Sartre 1943: 81-106): that is, for them to deny their own undeniable freedom to present
new, exciting narratives, to string together the kind of storylines which makes us look at
old themes in novel, interesting ways (see also Rorty 1980: 365-79). There are various
academic, institutional forces that entice social researchers to deny their own freedom,
be it the urge for “scientific” recognition or the loyalties to established academic clans
and their patriarchs. Firstly, whether positivist or falsificationist, researchers often allude
to “science” or “scientific procedures” to justify the methodological decisions they make.
However, as I have pointed out in the above and elsewhere, references to “the scientific
method” are always problematic given the methodological diversity between scientific
disciplines  and  even  within  them.  Secondly,  institutionalised  loyalties  towards  an
intellectual school (or towards a mentor) risk culminating in repetitive practice whereby
empirical research is seen simply as an instantiation of the theoretical framework or
general orientation that is being adopted. It is difficult to break those loyalties given the
power relations involved and the extent to which they are tied in with academic job
prospects and career progression.
26 In a nutshell, my argument for a neo-pragmatist perspective, with its acknowledgement
that there is no neutral algorithm that will help us decide which theories or methods to
adopt, calls on researchers to escape those epistemological and institutional constraints
and  to  acknowledge  the  freedom  to  construct  innovative  narratives  and  help
communities redefine themselves. Following on from Sartre’s notion of “authenticity”
(as the mirror image of bad faith) (Sartre: 70-1), what I am proposing could be described
as “epistemological authenticity,” by which I mean that researchers ought to cast off
epistemological  shackles,  recognising  their  intellectual  ability  to  shatter  established
storylines and their moral responsibility to do so.
 
Levinas and the Encounter with the Other
27 My  argument  for  a  pragmatist-inspired  philosophy  centred  around  the  idea  of  self-
understanding ties in with Emmanuel Levinas’ arguments put forward in his Théorie de
l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (1970 [1930]), Le temps et l’autre (1991 [1947]),
Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (1974) and in particular in his magnum opus Totalité
et infini (1961). Compared to other French philosophers referred to as operating neatly
within  the  phenomenological  tradition,  like  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  Paul  Ricoeur  or
Jean-Luc Marion, Levinas occupies such a distinctive position and his central claims are so
strongly opposed to Husserl’s philosophy that it is difficult to justify labelling his work as
unambiguously phenomenological.  Influenced by Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber,
Levinas’ divergence from Husserl and other phenomenologists stems from their failure to
recognise the distinctiveness and irreducibility of the Other, and Levinas tries to show the
implications of  that  failure for  philosophy.  From his  early writings onwards,  Levinas
shows interest in the notion of escape, which refers to the positive need of the individual
to avoid the facticity of existence and in particular to break with the sheer individual
experience of being oneself. From the point of view of the later Levinas, the individual
can only achieve this distantiation towards the self by engaging properly with alterity. In
this regard, Levinas’ position heralds those of Edward Said and Homi Bhabha developed
half a century later. They denounce a large proportion of western thought and literary
criticism for not engaging sufficiently with different cultures and for imposing their own
dichotomies on what is by all accounts a radically different cultural landscape.
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28 For Levinas, Western philosophy, and indeed Western thought in general,  promotes a
distinctive and ultimately problematic relationship between the Same (or the self or the
subject)  and  the  Other,  and  phenomenology  is  no  exception  in  this  regard.  In  this
dominant view, otherness might provisionally appear as differentiated from sameness,
but this is only a temporary phase as the former can always be reinterpreted in terms of
the latter and be assimilated to it. The metaphor of light plays an important role in this
philosophical tradition: once otherness is illuminated, it loses its “alterity” (Levinas 1978:
74ff.). Hence, there is an inability on the part of western thought to experience, engage
with and learn from something that is truly different from itself.
29 Husserl’s phenomenology is a case in point, arguing as he does that any encounter with
the external world takes place through acts of meaning bestowed by the subject onto it.
The subject can only encounter otherness in so far as it is articulated and rearticulated in
terms  of  that  which  is  familiar  to  the  subject,  but  by  doing  so,  the  very  nature  of
otherness is negated (Levinas 1967, 1970). In contrast, Levinas wants to safeguard the
unfamiliarity of the Other against the invasions of the Same, and like Heidegger, he finds
it necessary to create a new terminology – a new language, one might say – to bring this
project to fruition. Rather than attempting to gain knowledge about the Other so as to
submit it to the logic of sameness, Levinas’ project entails that otherness is, by definition,
outside the grasp of the self. Otherness is not to be understood simply as that which is
“other than me.” To do so would be to downgrade it to something that is relative to me or
that I can articulate in terms of my vocabulary. For Levinas, the Other remains absolutely
external  to  me and,  by  virtue  of  its  radical  difference,  resists  conceptualisation and
intelligibility (Levinas 1961, 1967).
30 As many commentators have pointed out, a significant part of Levinas’ work consists of
an ethical shift in existential phenomenology, exploring as he does the extent to which
the  confrontation  with  others  imposes  a  variety  of  obligations  on  the  individual.
However, for my purposes, Levinas’ attention to the relationship between alterity and
dialogue is more important.  While Levinas wants to hold onto Husserl’s position that
intentionality represents the world through the mediation of consciousness, he is very
keen to emphasise that  the encounter with the external  world makes for a dynamic
exchange whereby the subject engages with and is affected by the Other. Comparably to
Gadamer’s  dialogical  notion  of  understanding,  Levinas  sees  the  confrontation  with
alterity also as an opportunity for the self to reassert, re-evaluate and redefine itself. In
the face of  otherness,  the self  can undergo change while still  retaining its  sameness
(Levinas 1961: 5-10).
31 Despite  his  notoriously  nebulous  language and his  lack of  interest  in  the status  and
objectives  of  contemporary  social  research,  Levinas’  treatment  of  the  complex
relationship between self and alterity is relevant here because of its substantial bearing
for a pragmatist-inspired philosophy of social science. Few social researchers and indeed
even fewer philosophers  of  social  science show a genuine interest  in the concept  of
otherness, let alone incorporate it into their writings. In their particular endeavours to
obtain reliable knowledge of the social  world,  neither the representationalist nor the
naturalist perspective on the social sciences engages properly with otherness. Wedded to
a spectator theory of knowledge, the social cartography model treats the encounter with
otherness  in  a  way  that  reinforces  the  theoretical  framework  in  operation,  thereby
replicating  familiar  theories  and undoing  the  unfamiliarity  of  empirical  experiences.
Likewise, naturalists tend to use metaphors and analogies with well-known phenomena
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to explain and possibly  predict  new,  unfamiliar  phenomena,  thereby again failing to
engage  properly  with,  and  learn  from,  what  is  being  studied.  In  both  cases,  the
methodology is used as a strategic weapon to negate a genuine encounter with different
forms  of  life  –  to  ensure,  in  other  words,  that  no  real  surprises  are  in  store.  The
pragmatist-inspired  philosophical  project,  on  the  other  hand,  conceives  of  the
encountering  of  different  forms  of  life  as an  enormous  opportunity  to  redescribe,
reassess, and recreate ourselves (Rorty 1999: 87-8). In Levinasian parlance, one of the
central tenets of my proposal is to conceive of social research as a proper engagement
with  otherness,  refusing  to  reduce  alterity  to  sameness.  The  key  to  this  research
programme is  a  dialogical  model,  which  cuts  right  across  the  traditional  dichotomy
between the knower and the known. For this,  it  proves particular useful  to draw on
Gadamer’s account of understanding, which is more developed than Levinas’.
 
Gadamer and the Pursuit of Self-Understanding
32 Whereas Levinas’  thought is  embedded in the phenomenological  tradition,  Gadamer’s
central  arguments,  as  developed  in  Wahrheit  und  Methode  (1975),  are  often  seen  as
entrenched in hermeneutics. It is indeed true that Gadamer situates himself very much in
relation  to  the  “romantic  hermeneutics”  of  Wilhelm  Dilthey  and  other  nineteenth
century  authors.  However,  Husserl  and  Heidegger’s  influences  loom large,  especially
where  Gadamer  decides  to  deviate  from  nineteenth  century  hermeneutic  authors.
Gadamer shares Dilthey’s critique of positivist attempts to model the Geisteswissenschaften 
onto the  natural  sciences,  but  disagrees  with Dilthey’s  project  to  put  the social  and
historical sciences on as secure, objective a footing as the natural sciences (Gadamer 1975:
162-250).  Central to Gadamer’s position is Husserl and Heidegger’s argument that the
objective natural sciences can only emerge within a historically engraved “life-world.”
Parallel  to  my  own  rejection  of  naturalism,  Gadamer  argues  that  the  standards  of
“objectivity,” which are associated with the natural sciences, ought not to be seen as
norms for knowledge tout court because those “scientific” yardsticks, like any criteria,
have  developed  within a  particular  tradition.  Similarly  to  the  pragmatist call  for
methodological  diversity,  Gadamer  insists  that  to  treat  “scientific”  criteria  of
“objectivity” as the standards of knowledge is to neglect other historically situated norms
and criteria. In opposition to the Cartesian preoccupation with a method of objective
understanding,  Gadamer’s  “philosophical  hermeneutics”  explores  the  conditions  of
possibility of understanding. This philosophical project puts him on a collision course
with the Enlightenment orthodoxy which conceives of tradition and prejudice (Vorurteil)
as impediments to proper understanding. For Gadamer, nothing could be further from
the  truth  because  understanding  cannot  take  place  without  tradition  and  prejudice.
Resembling the pragmatist critique of the Enlightenment search for a neutral algorithm
for knowledge (Rorty 1999:  xii-xxxii),  Gadamer argues that any appeal  to reason and
method also necessarily draws on tradition and prejudice and thereby inevitably invokes
what  was  meant  to  be  eradicated.  However,  if  Gadamer  claims  that  tradition  and
prejudice are a sine qua non for understanding, he does not mean that understanding is an
individual or arbitrary accomplishment. Mirroring the pragmatist insistence on the social
and  historical  nature  of  knowledge  claims,  Gadamer  treats  tradition  as  a  shared
experience, rooted in and developed within a long historical trajectory. Gadamer coins
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the term “effective history” (Wirkungs geschichte) to refer to the way in which tradition
and its history affects us even when we try to shed their power (Gadamer 1975: 250-360).
It would be easy to misinterpret Gadamer or to infer the wrong conclusions from his
work. From Gadamer’s assertion that understanding is always socially and historically
constituted,  we  should  not  infer  that  researchers,  like  other  individuals,  have  a
philosophical licence simply to impose their categories and presuppositions on what they
study. We have seen earlier how the social cartography model adopts this erroneous view
of research, projecting as it does theoretical categories onto the empirical material, and
thereby replicating and reinforcing them. As I have indicated in the above, the upshot of
this representational perspective is a peculiar form of theoretical ossification whereby
empirical material is devalued and treated as simply an instantiation of the theoretical
framework to which the research is wedded. In contrast, Gadamer’s notion of genuine
understanding is quite different because it ties in with what I called self-understanding;
that is with the recognition of one’s own fallibility and a willingness to learn and see
things differently. Just like an authentic dialogue whereby participants are treated on an
equal  footing  and  are  prepared  to  find  out  about  other  points  of  view,  genuine
understanding  or  Verständigung  involves  openness  towards  the  unfamiliar  and  a
willingness to learn from it in the hope of reaching an agreement. In a move which is
particularly relevant to my argument about the significance of self-knowledge in social
research,  Gadamer  contends  that,  in  the  case  of  genuine  understanding,  people  are
willing to recognise the validity and coherence of what is being studied to such an extent
that this recognition might undermine some of their own presuppositions. In Gadamer’s
terminology, understanding eventually leads to “self-formation” or Bildung, the process
by  which  individuals  and  communities  take  on  a  larger  perspective  and  realise  the
fallibility or parochial nature of beliefs they have hitherto cherished. Eventually, self-
formation does not simply imply that people obtain knowledge of new forms of life but
also that they acquire deftness in obtaining that type of knowledge. The gebildete culture
is one in which people have acquired the ability to judge and discern (Gadamer 1975: 7-16,
77ff.).
33 Following on from Levinas’ mission to preserve the distinctiveness of the Other against
on-going attempts to assimilate it to the familiar, Gadamer’s dialogical perspective on
understanding  and  his  notion  of  Bildung  tie  in  neatly  with  the  concept  of  self-
understanding that occupies such a central role in my pragmatist-inspired perspective.
However, whereas Gadamer considers the relationship between understanding and self-
understanding in ontological terms, my pragmatist-inspired perspective wants to exploit
it methodologically.  The question, then, is no longer whether understanding necessarily
entails an element of self-understanding, but how to use this notion of self-understanding
as  a  criterion  to  evaluate  and  judge  social  research,  and,  conversely,  which
methodological strategies can be conceived to bring about this reflexive stance. As shown
elsewhere, genealogical historians, post-processual archaeologists and the exponents of
the critical turn in anthropology have been effective in pursuing self-understanding in
this sense (Baert 2005: 157-65), though it is worth emphasising they have done so within
the  specific  intellectual  climate  in  which  they  were  writing,  and  that  there  is  no
guarantee that their methodological orientations will remain equally successful in the
future  or  in  a  different  context.  So  to  appeal  for  a  methodological  reading  of  the
dialogical notion of understanding is not to invoke yet another elusive neutral algorithm,
but it is to be sensitive to the cultural importance of self-knowledge and the central role
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the social sciences can play in this, and to reflect on the methodological strategies which
in a given context are well suited for this purpose. The picture that emerges is one in
which social research is seen as an encounter with otherness, potentially facilitating or
encouraging a community to reflect on its presuppositions, including those that underlie
the research.  In  contrast  with traditional  philosophy of  social  science that  has  little
regard  for  self-edification,  my  appeal  for  a  gebildete  research  revolves  around  the
importance of the broadening of people’s perspectives.
 
Social Research, Reflexivity and Societal Engagement
34 In contrast to their contemporaries in Vienna and Cambridge, classical pragmatists, like
Dewey and Mead, wanted philosophy and the social sciences to engage with the social
world, to make it a richer, more diverse and altogether more interesting place. Dewey’s
contributions to educational theory are a case in point, and so is the sociological research
conducted by members of the Chicago School (see, for instance, Abbot 1999, Joas 1993).
These examples show philosophy and the social sciences at their best, interacting with
and learning from the external world,  and attempting to give something back to the
communities  that  are  being  studied.  Since  then  the  further  institutionalisation  of
academics within university establishments and the intense professionalisation of the
social sciences has led to quite a different set-up (see, for instance, Jacoby 1986). This shift
has certainly not been altogether negative, bringing legitimacy and outside recognition,
securing improved work conditions and setting rigorous standards of intellectual quality.
However, in relation to the initial pragmatist ambitions about the relationship between
knowledge and practice, those institutional transformations have meant that intellectual
legitimacy  and  academic  recognition  have  become  stronger  priorities  than  practical
engagement.  Whereas  earlier  sociologists  addressed  significant  political  and  social
concerns,  the  upshot  of  the  structural  changes  is  that  social  scientists  increasingly
address other social scientists and that their language and intellectual interests reflect
and reinforce this narrowing of horizons.
35 Against this backdrop, my argument for a new way of thinking about social research,
centred around an integration of American neo-pragmatism and Continental philosophy,
acquires  an  element  of  urgency.  In  contrast  with  the  academic  setting  today,  social
research in pursuit of self-understanding encourages researchers to be sufficiently open
to the unfamiliar, to take a broader perspective and reflect on the world we took for
granted hitherto. This type of research is about expanding our imaginative canvas and
practical reach, something to be achieved by learning from and reaching out to those
beyond the safe contours of the academy.
36 My argument in particular shows affinities with Michael  Burawoy’s recent plea for a
“public sociology,” which uses expert knowledge to promote debate with and amongst
various non-academic publics, thereby responding and adjusting to their demands and
ultimately providing “dialogue” and “mutual education” (Burawoy 2004, 2005). Burawoy
compares his notion of “organic” public sociology with “traditional” public sociology:
whereas the latter addresses an amorphous, invisible and mainstream public, the former
actively engages with a specific, visible and politically organised group of people. Both
forms of  public  sociology can perfectly  coexist  and indeed feed into each other,  but
Burawoy  argues  particularly  in  favour  of  the  organic  version  because  its  political
mandate is  better articulated,  it  has clearer direction and its practical  pay-off  is  less
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ambiguous.  Public  sociology,  so  he  argues,  is  not  only  different  from  mainstream
“professional sociology” but also from “policy sociology.” While policy sociology attempts
to provide technical answers to questions provided by an external client, public sociology
develops a “dialogic relationship” between sociology and the public whereby the issues of
each partner are brought to the attention of the other, and each adjusts or responds
accordingly.  Whereas  both  professional  and  policy  sociology  construct  “instrumental
knowledge,”  public  sociology  shares  with  “critical  sociology”  a  preoccupation  with
“reflexive knowledge” or “dialogue about ends.” Public sociology should not be conflated
with critical sociology, however: whereas both professional and critical sociology target
an academic audience, public sociology, like policy sociology, embarks on a dialogue with
non-academic publics about the “normative foundations” of society.
37 While Burawoy’s passionate argument for a more socially engaged sociology is appealing
and indeed has obtained worldwide attention, he focuses mainly on the actual practical
engagement of sociologists with their publics. Less attention is given to exploring the
type  of  knowledge  acquisition  involved  in  the  kind  of  reflexive  sociology  which  he
promotes.  Following the distinction by the Frankfurt School between substantive and
instrumental rationality, Burawoy differentiates reflexive sociology from policy sociology
on the basis that it establishes goals and values rather than means. But this definition
remains notoriously vague, especially given that what counts as a value in one context
can be a means for acquiring a value in a different context. Meta-theoretical discussions
about the future of the discipline of sociology, as the debate around public sociology
certainly is, need to be accompanied by philosophical explorations of the methodological
issues involved. Otherwise the arguments presented have a hollow ring to them and can
easily be dismissed as mere statements of intent, devoid of any substance.
38 The pragmatist-inspired proposal, outlined here – with its rejection of foundationalism,
naturalism  and  representationalism,  its  emphasis  on  self-understanding,  and  its
exploration of the link between knowledge and action – provides the right philosophical
backing to support and define the type of social scientific knowledge that engages with
groups and communities outside the safe contours of the ivory tower. However, this is not
to say that the Gadamerian dialogical model of knowledge, for which I have been arguing,
is  solely  relevant  for  non-academic  publics.  Social  research  in  the  pursuit  of  self-
understanding  cuts  right  across  Burawoy’s  distinction  between  critical  and  public
sociology because the reflexivity that is built  in affects presuppositions that are held
within academic as well as non-academic communities.
39 This is particularly clear in the case of Zygmunt Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust
(1991) – a prime example of the type of research I have in mind. This not only invites a
broader non-academic audience to rethink the nature of the atrocities during the Third
Reich, but also challenges some of the presuppositions sociologists and philosophers hold
about the value, the possibilities and the dangers of the transition towards modernity.
Challenging the Sonderweg thesis and opposing the orthodox view that modernity and the
Holocaust are antithetical, Bauman persuasively argues that key features of modernity –
the  “garden” notion of  the  nation-state,  and a  process  of  bureaucratisation with  its
increasing instrumental rationality and decreasing sense of individual responsibility –
were necessary conditions for the emergence of the Holocaust. By doing so, Bauman goes
further than arguing against the popular conception that the atrocities committed during
that period were somehow irrational outbursts or indicative of the fact that the project of
modernity  had not  quite  been accomplished.  Crucially,  his  analysis  also  implies  that
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sociologists  ought  to  reassess  their  views  about  the  project  of  modernity  itself,  a
reassessment  which  ultimately  affects  how  they  conceive  of  their  own  discipline,
entrenched as it is in the Enlightenment vision. In short, this example indicates that, in
practice, the rigid distinction between Burawoy’s critical and public sociology may be less
relevant than he assumes it is. This is because any substantial dialogical knowledge, of the
kind I  have been arguing for and which Bauman epitomises,  will  be relevant to both
academic and non-academic communities.
 
Conclusion
40 This chapter has sought to demonstrate the fruitfulness of an ongoing dialogue between
American neo-pragmatism and Continental philosophy, which, for far too long, have been
regarded as addressing irreconcilable intellectual concerns. It has explored the affinities
which exist between my own neo-pragmatist agenda in the field of philosophy of the
social sciences, and the philosophical outlook developed by Sartre, Levinas and Gadamer.
Rather than conceiving of  social  research as,  primarily,  an explanatory or predictive
endeavour, I have shown that this neo-pragmatist view promotes social research in terms
of an ongoing engagement with otherness, a process which ultimately contributes to the
pursuit of richer forms of collective redescription. In this view, research takes a central
role  in  the  ability  of  communities  to  distance  themselves  from  their  hitherto
unacknowledged presuppositions, to assume different points of view and, ultimately, to
make a difference to the social world which those communities have helped to create and
which  they  inhabit.  This  neo-pragmatist  approach,  I  have  argued,  presents  a
philosophical  basis  for  the  reflexive  knowledge  entailed  in  both  critical  and  public
sociology.
41 One  final  issue  needs  to  be  addressed.  As  my  neo-pragmatist  perspective  aims  to
contribute to the philosophy of the social sciences, the question inevitably arises which
theories  are well  (or  ill-)  suited to bringing about  the reflexivity  which I  have been
advocating? From the above,  it  should be clear that my answer is  that,  unlike other
philosophies of social science such as falsificationism or critical realism, this pragmatist-
inspired proposal is neutral vis-à-vis theory choice in so far as it refuses to invoke external
criteria – such as falsifiability, explanatory power or predictive success – to decide on the
value of a given theory. Instead, it suggests that we should take into account the context
of the dominant presuppositions of  the discipline or indeed of a community at large
before  evaluating  the  theory  under  consideration  because  it  is  only  against  this
background that such an evaluation can beachieved. Alfred Schutz’s notion of “stock of
knowledge at hand” is particularly applicable here because it captures very well how, in
their everyday life, people approach the social world in terms of “familiarity and pre-
acquaintanceship” (Schutz & Luckmann 1973). Just as everyday life is embedded in the
Lebenswelt  –  a  world  of  everyday  life  governed  by  the  “natural  attitude”  –  social
researchers  take  for  granted  a  number  of  theoretical  and  metaphysical  beliefs  and
methodological strategies. It follows from the above that theories ought to be evaluated
on the basis of how much of a Gestalt-switch they manage to bring about – how much they
could  bring  researchers  to  rethink  those  hitherto  deeply  entrenched  and  often
unacknowledged presuppositions. In opposition to the ritualistic hero-worship, which is
so endemic in the social sciences today and which is tied in with the representational
model of social researcher, the pragmatist-inspired perspective calls for less deference
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and bolder claims – an intellectual iconoclasm of sorts. The question should no longer be
how we can apply the works of our intellectual heroes or preferred models (whatever
they are)  to the empirical  data,  but  how we can learn from the encounter with the
unfamiliar to challenge them and think differently.
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ABSTRACTS
This article introduces a new pragmatist-inspired perspective on the social sciences. It explores
the relevance of neo-pragmatism for the philosophy of the social sciences, showing how it can
lead to innovative and groundbreaking social research. The paper attempts to drive home these
insights by elaborating on the affinities of neo-pragmatism with some Continental philosophers
who have engaged with Husserl’s phenomenology, notably Gadamer, Levinas and Sartre. This
neo-pragmatist  proposal  for  the  social  sciences  develops  a  non-representational  view  of
knowledge and puts the ongoing engagement with difference at the centre of social research.
From this perspective, the process of knowledge formation is dialogical in nature whereby the
researcher learns as much from those who are being researched as vice versa.  The concluding
section  aims  to  show the  implications  of  this  perspective  for  current  research  in  the  social
sciences, throwing new light on contemporary meta-discussions about social research.
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